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THE NATIONAL IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
This panel was convened at 1:00 p.m., Friday, April 10, by its moderator Alexander K.
A. Greenawalt of Pace Law School, who introduced the panelists: Elizabeth Evenson of
Human Rights Watch; Nina H.B. Jørgensen of the Chinese University of Hong Kong Faculty
of Law; Makau Mutua of SUNY Buffalo Law School; and Sarah Nouwen of the University
of Cambridge.*
The International Criminal Court: Promise and Politics
By Makau Mutua†
Introduction
The International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) is an institution born of necessity after
a long and arduous process of many false starts. The struggle to establish a permanent
international criminal tribunal stretches back to Nuremberg.1 The dream, which was especially
poignant for the international criminal law community, for a permanent international criminal
tribunal was realized with the adoption in 1998 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.2 The treaty entered into force in 2002. Those were heady days for advocates
and scholars concerned with curtailing impunity. No one was more ecstatic about the realiza-
tion of the ICC than civil society actors across the globe, and particularly in Africa, where
impunity has been an endemic problem.3 Victims who had never received justice at home
saw an opportunity for vindication abroad. This optimism in the ICC was partially driven
by the successes, however mixed, of two prior ad hoc international criminal tribunals—the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia.
Advocates were hopeful that the ICC would learn valuable lessons from the mistakes of
the ad hoc tribunals and become the altar of international justice for states that were unable,
or unwilling, to hold accountable the most egregious offenders. However, there is a growing
narrative that the ICC has been more of a heartbreak for victims—and an impotent protagonist
for offenders—than its supporters had imagined. More than a decade since it went live, the
ICC has badly stumbled while its beneficial effects to municipal law have been minimal, if
any. The institution that was supposed to drastically curb the culture of impunity across the
globe, and open a new page for the rule of law, is today more a symbol of what could have
been. The concept of the ICC remains valid, but the results point to an institution that is
under siege. What went wrong? Can the ICC be salvaged, or has it been mortally wounded
by its own mistakes and the institutional defects inherent in it? I offer several reasons why
the ICC has failed to lead a new era in the domestication of the norms and processes of
international criminal law. The international criminal law and human rights communities are
* Mr. Greenawalt, Ms. Evenson, and Ms. Nouwen did not contribute remarks for the Proceedings.
† SUNY Distinguished Professor at SUNY Buffalo Law School.
1 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court (2005).
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (adopted July 17, 1998) [hereinafter,
Rome Statute].
3 Brigitte Suhr, Lubanga Sentence Vindicates Faith in ICC, Al Jazeera (July 18, 2012), at http://www.aljazeera.-
com/indepth/opinion/2012/07/2012717124034534428.html.
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prone to narratives of optimism but blind to sins of conception. This disconnect does not
augur well for the ICC. It may not be too early to think about a post-mortem of the ICC if
fundamental reforms are not carried out to save the institution.
Failure of Leadership
Young international institutions, especially those born with high expectations, must live
up to the hype which brought them into existence. To do so, they must be seen to effectively
discharge their mandates, but this requires a leadership that is able to mold the institution
and build clear and purposeful objectives and structures. For the ICC, not a single office
was more important than the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). The person of the prosecutor
occupies a unique office within the court. The prosecutor is the single most important
individual within the system, and is the key to the effectiveness of the court and the judges.
It is the prosecutor who must decide the situations that warrant investigation and prosecution.
In that sense, the prosecutor exercises discretion that can ultimately determine case selection
and the perception that the world has of the court. Judges are clearly important actors within
the court, but they are helpless to adjudicate cases that the prosecutor has failed to investigate
and litigate effectively.
With all due respect to him, Luis Moreno Ocampo, the inaugural prosecutor of the ICC,
must share some of the blame for the failures of the court. He did not create a formidable
institutional identity for the OTP. This would have given the judges opportunities to impress
the court’s foes and friends alike. He was arguably a successful champion of justice in
Argentina, but Moreno Ocampo’s performance at the ICC left much to be desired. His
proclivity for theatrics and a showman’s flair boomeranged against the court. He was so
consumed with public appearances that he apparently did not pay adequate attention to his
role as the founding prosecutor. By the time he left office, the ICC had virtually nothing to
show for its decade of existence. The lack of effectiveness of the OTP and Moreno Ocampo’s
failure to engage meaningfully with states, sapped the enthusiasm that many had for the
court. The long interminable delays and setbacks in the cases he pursued caused much despair
among victims and advocates.4
Defects of Conception
In retrospect, the acclaim that greeted the court should have been tempered by its many
structural and normative problems. First, the introduction of the UN Security Council (UNSC),
a political body, into the work of the ICC, a legal body, unduly politicized it and opened it
up to attacks that have weakened it to domestic audiences.5 The UNSC arrogated to itself
the power to refer6 and defer cases,7 and can do so for reasons that have nothing to do with
the law or justice. The Security Council’s referral of Libya to the court stands out for a
number of reasons.8 The African Union’s (AU) mediation efforts to end the conflict were
4 Ali Ezzatyar, Fending off Failure: The International Criminal Court’s New Chief Prosecutor, The Moderate
Voice (June 27, 2012), at http://themoderatevoice.com/151042/fending-off-failure-the-international-criminal-courts-
new-chief-prosecutor/.
5 Charles Jallow, Dapo Akande, & Max du Plessis, Assessing the African Union’s Concerns about Article 16 of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 4 Afr. J. L. Studies 5-50 (2011).
6 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b).
7 Id. at art. 16.
8 ICC, ‘‘Situation in Libya’’ (Feb. 26, 2011), at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/
situations/icc0111/Pages/situation%20index.aspx.
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ignored by NATO and the UNSC. This referral has been widely condemned as an attempt
to use the ICC to advance the blatant agenda of global powers to get rid of Muammar
Gaddafi, an old enemy of the west. Many commentators pointed to the lightning speed of
the referral as an example of the UNSC’s and the ICC’s racial bias against Africans.9 It does
not help that all the cases before the Court are African.10
Ironically, the Security Council’s inability and failure to act more forcefully on Sudan’s
Omar al Bashir, a sitting African head of state indicted by the ICC, has compounded the
appearance of the Court’s impotence. It paints a picture of a Court mired in the cauldron of
politics. In November 2013, the UNSC declined to defer the Kenyan cases of Uhuru Kenyatta
and William Ruto, respectively elected president and deputy president in April of that year.11
But the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute bent to the will of the AU
and amended the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to accommodate indicted high officials,
such as heads of state, during trial. Such officials may be excused from appearing in person
for particular court sessions.12 Finally, the Kenyan cases, especially Kenyatta’s, showed that
a state cannot be expected to cooperate in the prosecution of a sitting head of state. With
Kenyatta as head of state, Kenya refused to cooperate with the Court leading to the withdrawal
of his case.
Politicization of the Court
The UNSC’s intrusion into the court’s work is but one of many structural and political
questions hanging over its credibility. One can understand why the ASP is part of the structure
of the Court, but its powers give it a large latitude to bend the court to the will of powerful
states, or block of states, as has been the case with the AU. In the view of many, this amounts
to the political supervision of the court in response to non-legal questions. This conflation
of the politics and law at the UNSC and ASP levels denies the court the credibility it needs
to lead states parties in the domestication of international criminal legal norms. In fact, it
sets the opposite example—that power, geopolitics, and might can trump law. This is the
very definition of impunity. So, in a paradox, the ICC’s structural deficits help entrench
rather than combat impunity. It is true that the ICC is a creature of political compromise,
which is a necessity for intergovernmental organizations, but it cannot be taken seriously if
it is failing at its core mandate—holding the most powerful accountable for heinous offenses.
President Uhuru Kenyatta was credibly alleged to have orchestrated and funded the 2008
post-election violence in which 1,300 people were killed, 600,000 displaced, and thousands
maimed, raped, and pillaged.13 Yet, if one is to believe the ICC Prosecutor, Kenyatta was
able to go scot-free by killing, bribing, and intimidating witnesses, and coercing them to
recant their sworn testimonies. The ICC’s witness protection program is poorly conceived
and executed. The Kenyan cases demonstrated that indictees could interfere with, and even
9 ICC Forum, Is the International Criminal Court Targeting African Inappropriately (Mar. 2013-Jan. 2014), at
http://iccforum.com/africa.
10 Makau Mutua, The International Criminal Court in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities, Norwegian Peace
Building Centre (NOREF) (Sept. 2010), at http://www.peacebuilding.no/Themes/Peace-processes-and-mediation/
publications/The-International-Criminal-Court-in-Africa-challenges-and-opportunities/(language)/eng-US.
11 Bid to Defer International Court Criminal Cases of Kenyan Leaders Fails, AllAfrica.com (Nov. 15, 2013),
at http://allafrica.com/stories/201311151551.html.
12 ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 134, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and-
%20tools/official%20journal/Pages/rules%20of%20procedure%20and%20evidence.aspx.
13 Kenya Failing Post-Election Violence Victims, Says Amnesty, The Guardian (July 15, 2014), at http://
www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jul/15/kenya-post-election-violence-amnesty-international.
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kill and disappear witnesses with impunity. As the OTP pre-trial brief stated, Kenyatta
literally cleaned up the evidence.14 And yet the Court and the ASP have been powerless to
hold Kenya accountable. The prosecutor had no choice but to withdraw the case in the face
of blatant violations of the Rome Statute, and Kenya’s own laws, including the Kenyan
Constitution. The Kenyan cases demonstrate that a state with some international clout—a
strategic economy with a geopolitical nexus, a collaborator on the war on terror, and wealthy
indictees, can prevail against the ICC by hook, or crook. There is no other way to describe
how and why Kenyatta managed to defeat justice at the ICC. It was not because of the
cynical narrative by the African Union that the ICC has been ‘‘race hunting’’ Africans.
Otherwise how would one explain the AU’s support for the ICC in Cote d’Ivoire, Mali,
Central African Republic, the DRC, and Uganda, which has referred Joseph Kony of the
Lord’s Resistance Army and his lieutenants to the ICC?15 These acts of politicization have
robbed the ICC of the power of demonstration—to show states how impunity can be combated
at home. The ICC is an incomplete institution because powerful, global hegemons like the
United States and new powers like China and India, and old ones like Russia, have spurned
the Court. These body blows empower cynics to delegitimize the ICC among pliable domestic
actors.
Conclusion
International law does not, and is not meant to, displace domestic law. This is true in all
areas of international law, but it is even truer in human rights and related fields where the
state is the obligor to those who live under its roof. States must be willing to submit themselves
to constitutional norms of behavior that safeguard human rights. That is the only way
international law plays the role described by Marti Koskenniemi as the ‘‘gentle civiler of
nations.’’16 Intergovernmental organizations and other multilateral agencies can bring the
hammer down against certain states, but in the end, violator states must undertake to respect
certain values. Where the intergovernmental organization lacks moral standing, or is viewed
as compromised by big power politics, it loses its ability to inspire and engender domestic
respect, including the domestication of its norms. This may soon become the fate of the
ICC, unless there are some drastic changes. In Kenya, for example, the International Crimes
Act, which domesticated the Rome Statute, is under threat of repeal by the detractors of the
ICC. The law has become more of a formality than legal reality because there is no political
will to invoke it in the courts. The police force, the country’s attorney general, and the
director of prosecutions are unable, and unwilling, to enforce the law because they are
beholden to cartels of impunity. That is why I conclude where I started—the ICC failures
at The Hague have sabotaged attempts to domesticate its norms and values among states
parties. It is worrying that the ICC may be abandoned by victims who increasingly see hope
for justice at The Hague as a phantom of the imagination. My hope is that Fatou Bensouda,
the experienced jurist who succeeded Moreno Ocampo, will act to correct some of the more
avoidable problems. We may start contemplating a post-mortem of the ICC unless its structural
and conceptual deficits are addressed.
14 Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Withdrawal of Charges
Against Mr Kenyatta (Mar. 13, 2015), at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1936247.pdf.
15 Vincent Nmehielle, Africa and the Future of International Criminal Justice (2012).
16 Marti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law
1870-1960 (2004).
